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Without doubt, the recession which began in late 1979 had a trau-
matic effect on the Scottish labour market. Unemployment rose dramat-
ically to top the 300,000 level. There were a number of major plant 
closures: these contributed to a rapid fall in the level of employ-
ment, particularly in the manufacturing sector. Vacancies dropped to 
very low levels: by December 1981, there were 26 people unemployed 
for each vacancy notified to the employment offices. This chapter sur-
veys these developments and sets them within the broader context of 
the difficulties caused by the world recession. 
Economic Trends 1980-1982 
The UK economy was already in deep recession by the beginning of 
1981. Industrial production had been falling sharply since mid 1979. 
This was the result of weakening demand pressures abroad coupled with 
the severe squeeze placed on the domestic economy by the government's 
monetary policies. 
The manufacturing sector bore the brunt of the recession. With 
profit margins already eroded by high wage settlements and interest 
charges during 1980, manufacturers responded by rapidly running down 
their stocks, thus easing their cash flow difficulties. With demand 
being met from stocks rather than production, output plummeted. By the 
end of 1981, the level of stocks held in the economy was £4.3bn lower 
at 1975 prices than it had been at the beginning of 1980. Over the same 
period manufacturing production fell by nearly 11%, a more rapid decline 
than had occurred during the great depression. 
In Scotland, the position was much the same. Desperate for the 
























stocks. Some did not succeed. British Aluminium (Invergordon), Keill-
er (Dundee), Sunbeam (East Kilbride), Robb-Caledon (Dundee) and Talbot 
(Linwood), were amongst the casualties. There were many more, smaller 
and less newsworthy, who failed to make the grade in 1981. Scottish man-
ufacturing output spiralled downward: by 2nd quarter 1981 it was 8% 
down on its level at the beginning of 1980. The Scottish CBI were pess-
imistic about business prospects. On average, a balance of 12% of their 
respondants in 1981 felt the business situation was worsening. The CBI 
leadership called for limited reflation to bolster their members' sagg-
ing order books. 
Nevertheless, by early 1982, there were slight glimmers of hope 
that the tide had turned. It seemed that the low point of the recession 
had been reached in the second quarter of 1981. A small, but percept-
ible, increase in output occurred in the third and fourth quarters. 
The rate of destocking declined sharply and business optimism improved. 
At last there seemed to be prospects for a return to economic growth 
following the catastrophic decline of 6% in UK GOP between the first 
quarter 1980 and the second quarter 1981. 
The modest revival in the UK economy in the latter part of 1981 
brought no immediate prospect of improvement in the labour market how-
ever. The labour market tends to react rather slowly to changes in the 
demand for goods and services. Employers are normally reluctant to lay 
off workers, particularly skilled workers, until they are convinced 
that the downturn in demand for their product is permanent. Likewise, 
when there is an improvement in demand, employers do not immediately 
hire new workers, with all the commitments (written and unwritten) 
which that entails. Instead they hold back, delaying the decision to 
hire until convinced that increased demand will not suddenly evaporate. 
Thus, the response of the labour market tends to lag behind dev-
elopments in the economy as a whole. However, the almost complete de-
terioration in firms' trading positions during 1980 and early 1981 did 
bring about an unusually quick, though negative, adjustment in the la-
bour market. When firms' very survival is at stake, they cannot afford 
the luxury of delaying a decision on manning levels: the decision to 
reduce staff must be taken abruptly. 
The 'shake-out' of labour in 1980 and 1981 was, if anything, more 
dramatic than the fall in production. Between first quarter 1980 and 
last quarter 1981, UK manufacturing output fell by 11%: but manufact-
uring employment fell by a massive 15%. The least efficient firms fell 
by the wayside and consequently average levels of productivity rose sub-
stantially. Output per worker grew more rapidly in the UK than in its 
major industrial competitors. While the government had highlighted the 
improvement in productivity as a vindication of its policies, the over-
all cost in lost jobs has not been given the same attention. 
On the supply side of the labour market, there was still a consid-
erable problem which stemmed from the 1baby boom' in the early to mid 
sixties. The rapid increase in births during this period, which occurr-
ed throughout Europe, has resulted in a considerable 'bulge' in new 
entrants to the labour market. The inexperienced and unskilled are at 
a considerable disadvantage when the labour market is slack, hence the 
rapid rise in youth unemployment. Government schemes to expand training 
and employment opportunities have been stepped up in order to imp~ove 
young people's prospects on the job market. But there is considerable 
doubt whether these schemes provide a long-term solution rather than a 
short-term palliative. 
The coincidence of this rapid increase in labour supply along with 
the slackness in labour demand resulted in a rapid rise in unemploy-
ment during 1980 and 1981, to post-war record levels. In the UK, un-
employment climbed inexorably toward the 3 million level, while in 
Scotland the unemployment rate rose dramatically. Having averaged 8% 
in 1979, it had risen to 15.3% by January 1982. 
Of course, aggregate figures conceal different experiences in 
different parts of the economy and for different groups of workers. 
Having given a rather broad brush outline of recent events, we may now 
look in more detail at developments in the Scottish labour market. 
This is best achieved by examining firstly demand conditions, second-
ly the behaviour of supply and finally the characteristics of the un-
employed. While these aspects of the labour market are undoubtedly 
interdependent, this classification is a useful means of organising 
the available information. 
The Demand for Labour 
Between December 1980 and December 1981 the number of employees 
in employment fell by almost exactly 100 thousand to 1878 thousand, a 
fall of 5% in a single year. During the sixties and seventies Scottish 
employment remained almost constant, at just over the 2 million mark: 
the gradual decline in the manufacturing sector being almost exactly 
offset by the expansion of services. In December 1980 it dipped be-
low 2 million and since then the decline has been dramatic (see Fig.l). 
The chronic liquidity problems of Scottish and UK businesses, mentioned 
earlier, are the root cause of this sudden 1 shake-out 1 • Lack of demand 
and competitiveness made a radical adjustment in the labour market in-
evitable. 
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The manufacturing sector shed labour most rapidly with 44 thousand jobs 
disappearing during 1981: only one in every 4 Scottish workers is now 
employed in manufacturing. By December 1981, the number employed in 
this sector was 472 thousand. In 1974 there were 676 thousand manufact-
uring workers: it is clear that the process of deindustrialisation is 
now well advanced in Scotland. All the various government assistance 
schemes have failed to halt the decline in Scottish manufacturing in-
dustry. 
The overall weakness in labour demand during 1981 was further com-
pounded by the failure of the service sector to expand in the fashion 
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which had bPcome usual during th<> sev<>nties. Indeed, service employ-
ment actually fell by 30 thousand during 1981. Compared with its pre-
vious trend this outcome is <>ven more remarkable than the dismal per-
formance of the manufacturing sector. The underlying causes of the de-
cline are, however, much the same. General weakness of demand and con-
straints on government spending have weakened the trading position of 
the service sector. Just as in manufacturing, there is considerable 
pressure on service employers to improve productivity in order to bol-
ster profitability. Until recently it has been notoriously difficult 
to increase the productivity of service sector workers. However, the 
introduction of new technology based on microprocessors perhaps poses 
a greater threat to secretarial and clerical workers than it does to 
manual operatives. The reduction of 20 thousand in employment in fin-
ancial and professional services during 1981 may well be indicative 
of this effect as banks and other financial institutions introduce 
new labour-saving devices in their operations. 
Perhaps the most depressed of all Scottish industries during 198~ 
however, was construction. Extremely hard hit by a long sequence of cut-
backs in government capital spending, Scottish construction output had 
fallen to 71% of its 1975 level by the third quarter of 1981. The re-
duction in local authority housing starts has been even more dramatic. 
In 1975 approximately 12,300 local authority houses were started: in 
1980 the number started had fallen to 2,800. Weakness of demand in the 
private sector as a result of soaring interest rates further contri-
buted to the reduction in construction employment from 159 thousand 
to 134 thousand during 1981. 
Within manufacturing, weakening demand in the food and drink in-
dustries led to a fall of 6,000 jobs during 1981. The drinks industries 
were particularly hard hit with a reduction of 600 at Scottish and 
Newcastle breweries in Edinburgh. Many whisky distilleries worked short-
time and some closed completely, causing severe problems in rural areas 
where there is little alternative employment. The textile industry has 
also encountered difficulties and employment fell by 9 thousand to 68 
thousand during 1981. No part of the industry was impervious to decline: 
carpet making foundered in Dundee and Kilmarnock, and even the high 
quality knitwear industries in the Borders shed a considerable amount 
of labour. 
































Leyland, Talbot, Rolls Royce, Caterpillar Tractor, Robb Caledon and 
Burroughs were amongst the illustrious names who announced redundan-
cies during 1981. These contributed to the fall in total engineering
employment from 212 thousand to 193 thousand over the period. While 
there was encouraging news of expansion from some electronics companies 
such as NEC and Motorola, most industrialists do not forsee any general 
improvement in employment prospects for some time to come. 
In the North Sea Oil industry, however, pro$pects were more hope-
ful. Employment rose by 3.3 thousand to 49.6 thousand between June 1980 
and June 1981, mostly as a result of the continuing expansion of ser-
vicing facilities. The need for such facilities had been somewhat un-
derestimated in the initial stages of oil development. Geographically 
concentrated in the Grampian and Highland regions, they have played a 
major role in enabling these areas to avoid the worst effects of the 
recession. Notwithstanding the successes in electronics and the oil in-
dustry, the overall employment picture during 1981 was bleak and there 
was no prospect of any significant recovery during 1982. 
It is further worth noting that, because the sex ratio varies from 
industry to industry, the decline in employment has not been uniform 
for males and females. Females are concentrated in the service sector, 
whereas males have a stronger representation in manufacturing, construc-
tion and the utilities. Although, as mentioned earlier, the employment 
performance of the service sector during 1981 was very poor in relation 
to historic trends, the greatest absolute falls in employment occurred 
in those industries dominated by males. Over 70% of employees who lost 
their jobs between December 1980 and December 1981 were male. Males 
comprise a continuously declining proportion of the workforce: by 
the beginning of 1982 only 56% of total employees were male. Interest-
ingly the recession has had only a marginal impact on the number of 
females employed part-time. The low cost and flexibility of part-time 
workers have probably been important factors in their favour: employ-
ers are deliberately increasing the proportion of part-timers for the 
sound economic reason that they provide the most cost-effective method 
of meeting their requirements. 
The consideration of part-time labour brings home the point that 
the demand for labour is not measured simply by the level of employ-
ment. The number of hours employees work is another vital component of 
this demand. Scots workers have tended to work a greater number of 
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hours than their counterparts elsewhere in Great Britain. Herein lies 
the explanation of why male manual workers in Scotland tend to earn 
slightly above the GB average. 
Standard weekly wages are slightly lower in Scotland than in GB 
as a whole. But because Scots male manual workers tend to work slight-
ly more overtime, their average earnings are marginally greater. Over-
time payments do not make such a significant contribution to the earn-
ings of females and non-manual males. The relevant figures for April 
1981 are shown in Table 1. 
TABLE 1 AVERAGE GROSS WEEKLY EARNINGS, APRIL 1981 
AVERAGE WEEKLY EARNINGS 
SCOTLAND 
All full-time men 
Full-time manual men 
All full-time women 
Full-time manual women 
GREAT BRITAIN 
All full-time men 
Full-time manual men 
All full-time women 
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Overtime working is a sensitive indicator of cyclical pressures 
in the economy. When demand falls, employers' normal first reaction is 
to reduce overtime hours before cutting back on employment. Since em-
ployment has fallen dramatically during this recession, one would ex-
pect an even more dramatic decline in overtime hours. Fig. 2 plots over-
time hours in Scotland for the period. There was a substantial fall in 
overtime hours worked in Scottish manufacturing industry from a peak of 
1,593,000 hours in thE first quarter 1977 to 835,000 hours in the 
first quarter 1981. A slight increase in overtime occurred during the 
remainder of the year and this, along with the stabilisation of out-
put over the same period, has been taken by many commentators to in-
dicate that some tightening of the condition of the labour market can 
be expected during 1982. 
Perhaps the most dramatic indicator of the slackness of the labour 
market during 1981, however, was the substantial decline in industrial 
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FIGURE 2 OVERTIME HOURS IN SCOTLAND 
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working days were lost each year as the result of industrial stoppages. 
During the first half of 1981, working days were being lost at the rate
of 240 thousand per year, a massive reduction in the incidence of in-
dustrial action. As well as the fear of unemployment acting as a damper 
on union militancy, there were probably two other factors which contri-
buted to this decline. Firstly, the present government has made it 
clear that it has no wish to intervene in industrial disputes. Without 
the likelihood of such intervention to bring about some sort of com-
promise, the process of industrial action becomes more risky: unions 
have been unwilling to enter into costly disputes when their outcome 
has become increasingly uncertain. Secondly, in the absence of an in-
comes policy, the number of disputes which have arisen from complaints 
about relative wage differentials has also dropped sharply. 
Many of the unions based in the manufacturing sector have witness-
ed a rapid dwindling of their membership as a result of the recession. 
Not only will this weaken their financial position and therefore their 
ability to conduct prolonged disputes; it will also undermine their 
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political power since size of membership is normally a key factor in 
union politics. 
Relative to the rest of Great Britain, Scotland suffered a slight-
ly larger drop in total employment during 1981. In Scotland the reduc-
tion was 4.8% as against the GB figure of 4.3%. Only Wales and the 
West Midlands fared worse, the latter losing a staggering 5.8% of its 
workforce during a single year. The manufacturing sector declined at 
the same rate of 6.4% in Scotland as in the rest of GB. The West Mid-
lands paid the price for the lack of diversity in its manufacturing 
industries: employment in this sector fell by 8.2% in the twelve 
months to December 1981. The recession has weakened the demand for 
labour throughout Great Britain. Though Scotland has fared slightly 
worse than average in some sectors, its relative performance has not 
been as bad as in many previous recessions. As we shall see later, 
this conclusion is also borne out by the unemployment statistics. The 
diversification away from the manufacturing sector in general and from 
Scotland's traditional heavy industries in particular which took place 
throughout the sixties and seventies have rendered its economy less 
sensitive to cyclical fluctuations. 
Labour Supply 
The supply of labour is normally defined as the number of people 
who are presently participating in the labour market. Participating 
is taken to mean that the individual is either employed, self-employed 
or unemployed but willing to work. When there is no market clearing 
wage it is difficult to precisely define the numbers unemployed: when 
offered a sufficiently high wage nearly everyone will be prepared to 
enter the labour market. The normal practice is to let the unemployed 
define themselves either through the population census or by joining 
the unemployment register. 
During this recession there have been two opposing forces at work 
on the supply of labour. Firstly, when the labour market is very weak, 
unemployment durations extend (see Unemployment section). Some individ-
uals who experience such long periods of unemployment gradually lose 
their attachment to the labour force and come to regard themselves as 
no longer part of it. Traditionally this effect is felt to be strongest 
for women, but during this recession the evidence suggests that both 
sexes have been affected. Many men are now retiring early. To quote 























'~ong men, the proportions economically active in the age 
groups on both sides of the normal retirement age fell 
dramatically in the second half of the 1970's. For example, 
in 1975 about 25% of all men aged 65-69 were economically 
active as were some 85% of those aged 60-64. Today these 
proportions are thought to have fallen to only about 13% 
and 70% respectively. Falls on this scale over such a 
short period are unprecedentsd. High unemployment and 
the depth of the current recession have undoubtedly 
caused some to leave the workforce earlier than they 
would otherwise have done." 
These dramatic reductions occurred in Great Britain as a whole: 
in Scotland, a similar decline was evident, with the proportion of ec-
onomically active males aged over 65 falling by more than 50% between 
1971 and 1981. The number aged over 60 who were active in the labour 
market fell by some 57 thousand in the same period. Such a large re-
duction will have had a considerable effect on the balance of supply 
and demand in the market and inevitably exerted a downward pressure 
on the level of unemployment. It is difficult to predict whether this 
effect will be reversed when the labout market picks up. Having be-
come accustomed to long periods of leisure, older workers may decline 
offers to return to the labour market because of the disruption it 
would cause to their lifestyle. 
The second major influence at present acting on the supply of 
labour is the large inflow of young workers. The number of such en-
trants is more or less predetermined by the number of births which 
occurred sixteen to twenty one years previously. The vast majority of 
young people enter the labour market between the ages of sixteen and 
twenty one, the precise age depending on the date at which they decide 
to leave the educational system. 
Fig. 3 shows the number of births in Scotland over the period 
1960 to 1978. It clearly demonstrates the peak which occurred in the 
birth rate in the early sixties and the subsequent dramatic reductions. 
Unfortunately, the labour market is now experiencing the same 'bulge' 
of new entrants at a time when the demand for labour is extremely weak. 
These two effects, mainly discouraged workers leaving the labour 
supply and new entrants causing it to expand, have resulted in a rough 
constancy of the total amount of available labour in recent years. A 
crude estimator of the total supply of labour can be constructed by 
adding together total employment and unemployment. This total remained 
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fairly stable between 1978 and 1980 but exhibited a slight fall of 20 
thousand in 1981, entirely as a result of a fall in male participation. 
In the future, the problem of large numbers of new entrants to the 
labour supply will lessen in importance. Yet the Department of Employ-
ment still expects an increase of some 57 thousand in total labour 
supply between 1981 and 1986. Their argument is that the proportion 
of middle-aged females active in the labour market has not yet peaked. 
Already, Scotland has one of the highest female participation rates 
(49.1%) in Great Britain which in turn has one of the highest rates in 
Europe. A further increase to 50.3% is expected by 1986. 
Unemployment 
Throughout 1981 the supply of labour exceeded the demand. The re-
sult was a continuing high level of unemployment. The underlying trend 
was still upward and in June 1981 Scottish unemployment exceeded 300 
thousand for the first time in the post-war era. This represented two 
out of every fifteen workers. The path of unemployment during the last 
five years is shown in Fig.4. 
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With the government continying to give precedence to the fight 
against inflation, there was no attempt to stimulate the level of de-
mand and hence alleviate the immediate unemployment problem. This pol-
icy stance was a complete contrast to the Keynesian post-war orthodoxy. 
The underlying rationale was that in reality the government can do 
little to affect the long-run level of unemployment even if it can 
offer short-term palliatives. If labour markets are competitive and 
workers realistic, then a reduction of government involvement in the 
economy should not affect the underlying level of unemployment. This is 
the underpinning of the present policies. Both the exhortation to work-
ers to recognise the realities of the market place and the attempt to 
reduce the monopoly power of trade unions are consistent with this stra-
tegy. 
Yet even though some workers have undoubtedly priced themselves 
out of employment, it is clear that even more have lost their jobs be-
cause of a lack of effective demand. There is also a growing pessimism 
that the present unemployment problem is not simply a short-term di-
fficulty. None of the reputable economic forecasters expect unemploy-
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ment in the UK to drop below 2.5m in the next two years. Most of the 
longer-term projections are equally pessimistic. Such an outcome cann-
ot be accommodated by the present government's framework of understand-
ing: neither does it appear that the traditional Keynesian recipes 
would have much effect. Recent simulations by the National Institute 
of Economic and Social Research show that a typical Keynesian reflation 
would not make a significant impact at present levels of unemployment. 
Success in combating present unemployment levels may only come 
about through direct labour market intervention. For such interven-
tion to bear fruit, a necessary precondition is an understanding of 
the present structure of unemployment. To this we now turn. 
Firstly, the majority of the unemployed are male. During 1981 in 
Scotland, there were at least two unemployed males for each female. 
Male unemployment rates averaged around 15% whereas the female rate 
was only about 10%. There are two major reasons for this difference. 
Firstly, as noted earlier, most of the industries which have declined 
rapidly during this recession have predominantly employed males. Sec-
ondly, again as mentioned previously, females in general are not so 
committed to the labour market as are males. They have a much higher 
propensity to withdraw completely when their prospects deteriorate. 
Although they might be prepared to accept a suitable job offer, they 
will be deemed to have withdrawn from the labour market if they do not 
register as being unemployed. 
Secondly, most of the unemployed are manual workers. In December 
1981, 58.8% of the unemployed were either general labourers or belonged 
to other manual occupations. Only 7.5% were managerial and professional 
workers. 
The prospects for manual workers are bleak. Manual labour in third 
world countries is considerably cheaper than in the UK and technical 
innovations seem constantly to be aimed at reducing the manual input 
to given tasks. 
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TABLE 2 cont 1 d. 
OCOJPATION No. UNEMPLOYED* % OF TOTAL UNEMPLOYED 
General Labourers 103,333 33.9 
Other Manual Occupations 75,993 24.9 
All Occupations 304,648 100.0% 
*Unemployed at Employment Offices 
Source: Department of Employaent 
Unemployment also is striking the young with disproportionate se-
verity. In January 1982, 35% of unemployed Scottish males were aged 
under 25, and 51% belonged to the much larger group aged 25-54. For fe-
males, the age differentiation was even more marked, with 51% of the 
total being aged under 25 and 44% in the age group 25-54. Another indi-
cation of the heavy incidence of unemployment of young people is given 
by the statistics of school leavers unemployed (see Fig. 5). The graph 
shows clearly the rising trend in unemployment amongst school leavers 
and the peaks in July and December each year which result from the 
vagaries of the Scottish school-leaving system. Clearly many children 
spend longer on the dole than is necessary because their entry into 







FIGURE 5 UNEMPLOYED SCHOOL LEAVERS 
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The government has been responsive to the problems of the young 
unemployed, devoting to them a very large proportion of the total re-
sources earmarked for the jobless. During 1981, the Manpower Services 
Commission and the Department of Employment operated six 'Special Em-· 
ployment and Training Measures', all of them designed to alleviate 
the problem of excess supply in thE labour market. 
These schemes are: 
(1) Temporary Short-time Working Compensation Scheme 
This scheme was designed to encourage employers to use short-time 
working rather than declare redundancies. Firms who participate are 
eligible for 9 months support during which they are paid 50% of the 
wages normally paid to staff. Numbers involved in this scheme tended 
to decline during 1981, as the firms who initially had joined the 
scheme became ineligible. 
(2) Job Release Scheme 
This scheme is designed to compensate workers who decide to retire 
early and give their job to someone from the unemployment register. 
Married persons are paid £50.50 per week and single persons £40. 
(3) Youth Opportunities Programme 
Perhaps the best known of the special schemes, YOP provides a range of 
training courses and work experience schemes for unemployed young pe-
ople. A wide range of tYPes of work and training are encompassed by 
the scheme. Participants are paid a weekly tax free allowance of £23.50. 
(4) Community Industry 
This scheme is operated by the National Association of Youth Clubs and 
provides jobs for disadvantaged young people. Working mainly on commun-
ity projects, the participants are financed by a grant to the NAYC . 
(5) Community Enterprise Programme 
Replacing the Special Temporary Employment Programme (STEP), this scheme 
is aimed at providing temporary employment for the long-term unemployed. 
Those aged 25 years and over must have been unemployed for over 12 
months to be eligible, while those aged 18-24 must have spent 6 months 
on the dole. 
(6) Training for Industry 
This programme is designed to assist where normal industrial training 
schemes fall short of requirement. Grants are given to employers to 
take on apprentices and trainees additional to their normal quota. 
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The numbers engaged in the various special measures at the end of 
1981 are shown in Table 3 below. Clearly the Youth Opportunities Pro-
gramme is numerically the most important of the Special Training Mea-
sures and will have a significant effect on the recorded level of un-
employment. The overall reduction in unemployment caused by the schemes 
TABLE 3 SPECIAL EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING MEASURES 








depends on a number of factors: some participants in the schemes might 
have been picked up by private employers anyway: some will be used by 
employers in place of normal workers: some schemes will cause unemploy-
ment elsewhere by improving the trading position of some firms vis-a-
vis their competitors. Together, these factors imply that the special 
measures will not cause a one-for-one reduction in measured unemployment.
Recent estimates( 2 ) from the Scottish Office by Walker suggest that dur-
ing the period January to October 1981, when there were, on average, 
71 thousand supported by the special measures, the net effect on mea-
sured unemployment was to reduce it by 41 thousand. This may be a 
slightly conservative figure, reflecting perhaps the government's wish 
to dissuade commentators from adding the numbers on these schemes to 
the registered unemployed in order to estimate the 'true' or 'under-
lying' level of unemployment. Nevertheless, such a calculation is un-
doubtedly simplistic: the true effect of the special measures on the 
level of unemployment is the result of many complex economic inter-
actions. 
The impression that the special measures are merely palliatives 
has become fixed in the public mind. Though the Department of Employ-
ment and Manpower Services Commission have improved them considerably 
since the early days of the Job Creation Projects, this view is very 
difficult to dislodge. Some of the young unemployed directly affected 
by the schemes also regard them as inadequate. Yet on the whole, the 
unemployed have been strangely muted during the recession and are clear-
ly lacking an effective political voice. 
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The distribution of resources amongst the unemployed is also clear-
ly the result of political bargaining. Again, the unemployed themselves 
do not seem to have actively participated in striking this bargain. 
There seems to be a tacit acceptance that the bulk of assistance should 
be directed at the young unemployed. 
This bias must come at the expense of older workers who are like-
ly to have a more extensive range of commitments and responsibilities 
than the young. These commitments tend to 1nean that older workers are 
less mobile, both geographically and occupationally. Consequently, the 
older the worker the longer his or her spell of unemployment is likely 
to be. Figures on unemployment duration, shown below in Table 4 confirm 
this view. 
TABLE 4 PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF UNEMPLOYMENT 
DURATION BY AGE (MALES) SCOTLAND, JANUARY 1982 
Age 
Duration 
up to 6 months 
6 months to 1 year 









Source: Department of Employment Gazette 




Less than a quarter of unemployed Scottish males aged under 25 had 
been jobless for more than a year whereas 43% of those aged over 55 were 
in this state. The older worker, unemployed for a considerable period 
of time, is a growing problem but one which has not received much att-
ention from policymakers. Disillusionment and despair at the difficulty 
of finding new jobs have led many of them to accept the notion that 
they will never again be fully employed. Thus they withdraw from the 
labour force, taking early retirement by default rather than choice. 
Psychological and social problems tend to be associated with this patt-
ern of behaviour and their effects spread beyond the individual immed-
iately concerned to his or her wider family group. 
There is no objective way of comparing the harm which unemploy-
ment causes to different groups in the population. The distribution of 
resources amongst the unemployed will therefore depend entirely on the 
political process. The present arrangements, which favour the young, 
seem to have arisen through some perceived sentiment of the need to 
help this group. Until a more responsive political mechanism can be 
established to assist the unemployed it seems that aid will continue 
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to be extended in this somewhat ad hoc fashion. 
The distribution of unemployment within Scotland did not change 
radically during 1981, though there were some small but significant 
differences from the overall trend. The most obvious butlier' was the 
Shetlands, where unemployment rose by 60% between December 1980 and 
December 1981 against an overall Scottish increase of 24.3% (see Table 
5). Such a small area is, of course, subject to wide fluctuations as 
the result of expansion or contraction at individual plants. Thus the 
completion of the Sullom Voe project and the consequent 1,250 redun-
dancies has led to a quite severe reduction in employment opportunities 
in the Shetland labour market. 
Amongst the larger regions, there was some narrowing of unemploy-
ment rate differentials during 1981. Central Region, the Lothians, 
Grampian Region and the Borders, all began 1981 in a slightly favour-
able position relative to the rest of Scotland. Yet unemployment grew 
more rapidly in these areas, bringing their unemployment rate closer 
to the overall Scottish rate. In contrast, in Strathclyde, which 
accounts for around 60% of all unemployment in Scotland, the increase 
during 1981 was somewhat lower than in Scotland as a whole. Thus, al-
though the recession does seem to be particularly severe amongst cer-
tain industries, it does not appear to be selective in a spatial sense. 
Perhaps this is because the industries which have been particularly 
hard-hit e.g. construction, have a reasonable presence in all the 
Scottish regions. Perhaps it is because supply-side factors, such as 
the increase in young labour-market entrants, have been present in all 
regions. As yet, it is difficult to know which is the most important 
factor in narrowing the interregional unemployment differentials. 
It is also worth noting, however, that some important regions did 
not follow this process of narrowing regional differentials. Unemploy-
ment rates in Highland and Tayside regions were significantly below 
the Scottish rate at the beginning of 1981. During the year they grew 
less rapidly than in Scotland as a whole (this was particularly true 
in Tayside). 
While there is a possibility that the success of these regions 
will not be maintained (for example as a result of the closure of the 
Invergordon smelter in the Highland region), it is interesting to note 
that these two regions, which had previously ranked amongst the worst 
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TABLE 5 UNEMPLOYMENT IN THE SCOTTISH REGIONS 
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unemployment areas in Scotland, are now amongst the least badly affect-
ed by this problem. 
Often,regional aid and assistance to particular areas is based on 
indicators of poverty or deprivation. Frequently, unemployment rates 
are included amongst the most important of these indicators. Yet, at 
a time when unemployment is increasing rapidly, regional unemployment 
differentials are also apt to change with greater rapidity than pre-
viously. Thus, areas earmarked for assistance can suddenly appear not 
to have such a serious unemployment problem as was thought when policy 
was initiated. This obviously creates a dilemma for policymakers. Hav-
ing invested resources in alleviating the problems of one area, there 
will be considerable costs attached to switching attention to some 
different region. Until regional differentials stabilise once more, 
these costs are likely to be so high as to outweigh any benefits from 
such a change. 
The re-ordering of unemployment rate relatives is apparent within 
the UK as a whole, as well as within Scotland. Table 6 shows unemploy-
ment levels and rates in December 1980 and December 1981 in all the 
UK regions. Again, there is an obvious convergence in unemployment 
rates. Scotland, Wales, the North and Northern Ireland, normally con-
sidered the most depressed of the UK regions, all experienced increases 
in unemployment well below the national average. In contrast, the South 
East and West Midlands, with increases of 42.5% and 40.1% respectively, 
are rapidly worsening relative to the rest of the UK. This is most 
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graphically illustrated by considering the case of Scotland and the 
West Midlands, which also brings out the problem of switching mentioned 
above. In 1971, the unemployment rate in the West Midlands, at 2.9%, 
was exactly half of that in Scotland: by the end of 1981 the unemploy-
ment rate in the West Midlands exceeded that in Scotland by 0.3%. 
TABLE 6 UNEMPLOYMENT BY REGION - NOT SEASONALLY ADJUSTED 
AND INCLUDING SCHOOL LEAVERS (OOO's) 
DECEMBER 1980 DECEMBER 1981 %CHANGE 
South East 469.7 ( 6-2) 669.1 ( 8.8) + 42.5 
East Anglia 53.5 ( 7 • .4) 70.6 ( 9.8) + 32.0 
South West 142.9 ( 8.6) 180.4 (10.7) + 26.2 
West Midlands 243.7 ( 10.4) 341.6 (14.7) + 40.1 
East Midlands 133.6 ( 8.3) 172.8 (10.6) + 29.3 
Yorks & Humber 208.9 ( 9.9) 271.5 (12.9) + 30.0 
North West 322-.4 ( 11.3) 417.8 (14.6) + 29.6 
North 175.9 (12. 7) 213.9 (15.8) + 21.6 
Wales 138.0 (12.7) 168.9 (15.6) + 22.4 
Scotland 261.8 (11.6) 325.3 (14.4) + 24.3 
Great Britain 2,150.5 ( 9.1) 2,832.0 (12.0) + 31.7 
Northern Ireland 93.8 (16.3) 108.7 (18.9) + 15.9 
United Kingdom 2,244.2 ( 9.3) 2,940.7 (12.2) + 31.0 
Scotland's relative improvement can also be assessed by consideration 
of the ratio of Scottish and UK unemployment rates (seasonally adjusted) 
as shown in Figure 6. 
With unemployment in Scotland growing less rapidly than the UK, 
there was a substantial reduction in the relative ratio during 1981 
What lies behind this apparent improvement in the fortunes of the 
depressed areas relative to the rest of the country? Part of the explana-
tion must come from the nature of the present recession. The tradition-
al industries of these regions had been continually cut back by pre-
vious downturns in demand: with a much smaller manufacturing base, 
the depressed areas had less to lose. Further, as a result of govern-
ment intervention and the activities of development agencies, they were 
able to create a more diversified manufacturing sector. The present re-
cession, which hit the engineering industries very severely, left those 
areas still dependent on this sector very exposed. Half of the 120,000 
manufacturing jobs lost in the West Midlands during 1981 came from the 
engineering industries. 
The overall unemployment picture in Scotland is grim: currently 
youth unemployment is regarded as the major concern, but in the next 
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few years this may be superceded by the growing difficulties associated 
with long-term unemployment. 
Within Scotland there has been some convergence of unemployment 
rates toward the average and some switches in the ranking of regional 
unemployment rates. This is also true in the UK as a whole, with Scot-
land tending to switch down the ranking, implying that unemployment is 
no longer so severe relative to the rest of the UK. 
There are some grounds to hope that the worst of the increase in 
unemployment occurred during 1981. There has been some slowdown in the 
monthly increases in the number on the register (see Figure 7). Thus 
the rise during 1982 may not be so dramatic as occurred in 1981, and 
there may even be a levelling off in early 1983. The key long-term 
question is whether the Scottish labour market will recover the ground 
lost during the traumatic year of 1981. 
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FIGURE 7 PERCENTAGE CHANGES IN TOTAL UNEMPLOYMENT 
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